What's with the rift in the Sunni sheikdoms between Qatar and the rest of the hellhole countries?

Some sort of a political or personal vendetta is  going on between  Qatar and the other arab nations.  Was Qatar becoming too influential and looking like it would be the "go to"  big boss for the  leaders of the Judeo-Christian nations instead of  the Head headchopper, Saudi Arabia?  
The vid of the Qatar honcho talking about "democracy" is from 2009.

Maybe the articles below will give us more of an idea of what's happening ... or maybe they will further confuse us.  A lovely thought to think right now ...maybe we will get to see an anti-Qatar and pro-Qatar deadly tussles.  Won't that be just lovely ?!!

David B.Ottaway writing at NationalInterest:
Saudi Arabia and the United States are now working closely together to bolster Syrian rebels seeking the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad, reviving in the process an earlier model of covert military cooperation from the 1980s that successfully drove the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. This time their target is Russia’s last remaining Middle East Arab ally—the Assad regime, whose armed forces are equipped entirely with Russian weapons.



So far, the Obama administration has ruled out providing surface-to-air missiles to the Syrian rebels. But the Saudis are now reported to be going ahead with their own purchase of other non-U.S.-made missiles, apparently with American blessings, as Washington had previously stopped it..........
......  As during the Afghan war, the opposition in Syria is badly fragmented and the most extremist Islamic ones, particularly Jabhat al-Nusra, have proven the best fighters. Fear of U.S. arms ending up in the hands of Islamic extremists has been a prime factor in the Obama administration’s dithering for months over sending any arms to the rebels.

Another factor, however, has been the Saudi-Qatari tug-of-war over the Brotherhood’s role within the fractious Syrian opposition, also a central cause of the rebels’ inability to agree on leaders for its National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces or a government-in-exile to facilitate international support.

The Saudi-Qatari conflict is rooted in the two countries’ radically different experiences with the Brotherhood as well their markedly different reactions to the 2011 prodemocracy uprisings across the Arab world. Qatar enthusiastically embraced the changes that catapulted the Brethren to power in Egypt and Tunisia. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, after initially helping to orchestrate the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, has come to view the Brotherhood’s rise with growing foreboding.....

As'ad AbuKhali writing at AlAkhbar:
Anthony Shadid—one of the best reporters on the Middle East—wrote an article recently about Qatari foreign policy. The subject has attracted a lot of interest as of late: the Emir of Qatar and his prime minister have become dominant personalities in the meetings of the Arab League. The small state has been playing a role far beyond its traditional legacy. Qatar is now a leading Middle East country and its prime minister gets to decide whether Syria stays or leaves the Arab League. This is unprecedented. This, of course, owes much more to the role of Al Jazeera than to the gas deposits in Qatar. But the various analyses of Qatari foreign policy omits a key determinant of its foreign policy orientation.

Anyone who has discussed foreign policy with the Emir of Qatar—as I have on two occasions only, the second one last year—knows that enmity toward Saudi Arabia is a key determinant of Qatari foreign policy. People were too quick to forget about the bitter Saudi-Qatari feud as soon as Qatar and Saudi Arabia reconciled last year. When I saw the Emir in the summer of 2010, my first question to him was along the lines: so I take it that you and Saudi Arabia are allies now? He laughed and quickly sarcastically dismissed the notion and went on to elaborate on his still very negative views on Saudi Arabia and its role in the region. The Emir even puts his close military alliance with the US and his hosting of the US bases in the emirate in the context of his fears of Saudi diabolical plot. The Emir reasoned that aligning with Saudi Arabia’s enemies would be a sure bet to protect his regime from Saudi plot. The Emir wanted to prove to the US that he can be a more reliable ally than Saudi Arabia: and he went along with US Congressional pressure to normalize ties with Israel (up to a point as he had difficulty reconciling his regional alliances and his professed—privately—Arab nationalist views with his relations with Israel—which have been pursued vigorously by his prime minister)...........